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Abstract 
The Tradable permits (TPs) approach seeks solutions of property rights to 
resource and environmental problems by using incentive mechanism, which could 
meet predetermined environmental goals at a lower cost. It is a substantial innovation 
of environmental policy, which has rebuilt and is recreating the system of 
environmental policy. The TPs approach weakens or eliminates externality by 
establishing private property rights of environmental resources and allowing those 
rights to be traded, which is highly consistent with Coase Theorem. 
The categories of tradable permits include emissions trading, Individual 
transferable quotas in marine fisheries, transferable development rights of land in 
protective areas, transferable green certificates, and so on.  
The principal criteria about selecting tools of environmental policy are 
cost-effectiveness and reliability. A cost-effective scheme for pollution abatement 
requires all firms’ marginal abatement costs to be equal. The TPs tool is cost-effective 
and reliable as well. Government should impose some restrictions on trades of 
emission permit for non-uniformly mixed pollutants. The design of TPs policy is 
relatively complex, whose implementation is demanding. 
The early emission tradings in America are project-based tradings of emission 
reduction credits. Later emission tradings commonly take the form of allowances 
trading. The Acid Rain(Sulfur Allowances) Program is the most mature and successful 
program of emissions trading ever. The three mechanisms for reduction of global 
greenhouse gases stipulated in Kyoto Protocol are: emissions trading among annex B 
countries, clear development mechanism and joint implementation.  
 Mandatory emission standards and emission limits are primary control means 
about sulfur dioxide emission in China, market-based discharge fee is only a 
secondary tool. The experimentations of sulfur dioxide emissions trading in Taiyuan 
city and Jiangsu province are typical cases in China. Emissions trading in China can 
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 Biologic overfishing and economic overfishing are necessarily to occur in 
open-access ocean fishery. Biologic and economic models about fishery can reveal 
theoretically optimal harvest, fishing effort and fish stock. Traditional tools such as 
total allowable catch and regulation on fishing effort are not capable of solving 
overfishing ultimately. Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) establishes private 
tradable property rights of fishers about allowable catch, which is a very effective 
solution to overfishing. 
 The transferable development rights (TDRs) approach encourages development 
rights in areas facing development restriction to be transferred with repayment to 
appointed development areas. It smartly uses incentive mechanism to coordinate land 
development and environmental preservation, which not only can protect environment, 
but can guarantee fair compensations for land owners. The roots of inefficient 
conversion of Chinese farmland lie in unfair compensation for land acquisition and 
improper regulation on development rights of rural collective land. China ought to 
impose specific quantitive limits on development rights with farmland, and admit 
transferability of those rights.   
The tradable green certificates (TGCs) approach is called renewables portfolio 
standard (RPS) also. A green certificate is a voucher that implies definite amount of 
renewable electricity has been produced, which represents the right that some thermal 
power could be produced or sold. The TGCs approach is a market-based policy tool 
that can meet predetermined renewable energy goals at the least cost. The design of 
RPS in China should use international lessons，especially, those of Australia and 
Texas，for reference. 
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尽管 Dales 和 Crocker 正确地预见了排放权交易的特征，对这些特征的正式
证明却是由 Baumol 和 Oates（1971）完成的。不过他们的论文不是关于可交易
许可制度的，而是关于污染收费制度的，该收费制度是用来实现既定的环境目标
的。因为这两种制度的道理是完全等价的，所以从收费制度得出的结论对可交易
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